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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF 
THE STATE OF UTAH 
VICKIE JEAN BUTLER HEATH, s 
Plaintiff and : CASE NO. 13941 
Respondent, 
-vs-
X 
0ARRELL EUGENE HEATJH, 
Defendant and 
Appellant# $ 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
NATURE OF CASE 
This was an action filed by plaintiff seeking a divorce 
from defendant, and that plaintiff be awarded certain various 
relief including custody of a minor child and support money# Upon 
the 29th day of April, 1971 the divorce decree was signed by the 
Judge and filed in the Office of the Utah County Clerk# On the 
29th day of October, 1974 defendant filed a Motion to Set Aside 
the Judgment and Decree of Divorce based on various gronds# 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
The lower court, acting through the Hon* Joseph E# 
Nelson, signed a Judgment and Decree of Divorce which recited 
appellantfs default and awarded respondent, inter alia, a divorce, 
custody of the minor child, and $50#00 per month child support; 
said Default Judgment was filed on April 29, 1971• Thereafter, 
appellant1s Motion to Set Aside the Judgment and Decree of Divorce 
was denied by a Minute Entry denominated "Ruling" signed by the 
Hon. J. Robert Bullock, dated December 4, 1974» 
RELIEF SOUGHT AGAINST APPEAL 
Respondent seeks the affirmation of the lower courtfs 
Judgment and Decree and that the Supreme Court set at rest this 
case* 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The Complaint in this action was verified and filed 
on February 4, 1971 (R. 304), together with an Affidavit of 
Impecuniosity and an Order to Show Cause and Affidavit* The 
Complaint alleged, inter alia, that the parties to the action 
had had one child as issue of their marriage, whose custody 
should be awarded to plaintiff (paragraph 3 of complaint, R« 3)* 
The Order to Show Cause (R. 8) required defendants appearance 
on February 11, 1971, and the Sheriff's Return ($• 11) reflects 
that a Summons, Complaint, Order to Show Cause and Restraining 
Order were served upon defendant on February 9, 1971• No hear* 
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ings were held in connection with the Order to Show Cause (R. 
12-13). 
On April 28, 1971 the matter was heard by the Court. 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, and a Judgment and 
Decree of Divorce, were signed on April 29, 1971 and filed in 
the Clerk's office on that date (R. 14-16, R. 17-18). Both of 
those documents recited that it appeared Mto the satisfaction 
of the court that the defendant herein . •• was duly served in 
person with summons herein attached to a copy of the complaint 
on file ... .M and that ffthe defendant (had) failed to appear 
and answer the complaint ... the time for answering having expired 
and no answer having been filed and the default of said defend-
ant ... having been duly entered according to law/1 Finding of 
Fact No. 5 (R. 15) states: "That because the defendant is using 
drugs to excess and at the present time is in jail, the Court 
determined there would be no basis for reconciliation of the mar-
riage ;"• Conclusion of Law No. 3 (R. 15) states: That there is 
no basis for reconciliation of the marriage because of the defend-
ants (sic) excessive use of drugs and being in Jail, therefore, 
the 90 day waiting period should be waived.ff The Judgment and 
Decree of Divorce (paragraph three) contained an Order (R 17) that 
the ninety day waiting period was waived and a default certifi-
cate was filed in the clerk's office on April 29, 1971 (R. 20). 
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The complaint prayed (paragraph No. 3, R* 4) " $350*00 
per month alimony and support raoney;!f Paragraph No« 6 (R* 17-18) 
of the Judgment and Decree of Divorce herein awarded plaintiff 
$1*00 per year alimony and $50#00 per month child support, and 
judgment for $250*00 for the use and benefit of plaintiff's 
attorney* 
On November 1, 1974, defendant filed a Motion to Set 
Aside the Judgment and Decree of Divorce based upon the ground 
that said Judgment and Decree were based upon hearing held in 
contravention and violation of provisions of Sec* 30-3-18, Utah 
Code Annot* (1953), (R* 21), and upon the further ground, as set 
forth in defendant's Affidavit (R* 25-26), that the return was 
erroneous by reason of the fact that at the time of service re-
cited therein defendant did not reside at nor was he present in, 
Salem, Utah, but was in fact involuntarily restrained in the Utah 
State Hospital at Provo, Utah, and upon the further ground that 
thereafter the defendant was incarcerated in the Utah County Jail 
did not intend to default herein, but was discouraged from filing 
an Answer to plaintiff's Complaint by jail personnel who stated 
to him that he could not be released from custody to attend any 
trial in the action in any event* Said motion was denied by a 
ruling of the above Court dated December 4, 1974 (R* 27) and an 
additional Order denying the Motion was subsequently signed and 
filed herein on December 20, 1974* 
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ARGUMENT 
THE LOWER COURT DID NOT ERR IN DENYING DEFENDANT-
APPELLANT'S MOTION TO SET ASIDE THE JUDGMENT AND 
DECREE OF DIVORCE HEREIN 
The lower court had before it the record1 of the trial, 
the record shows the defendant-appellant was personally served 
with a twenty day Summons and in the affidavit of the defendant-
appellant to Set Aside the Judgment and Decree of Divorce 
defendant-appellant admits he had personal knowledge of the com-
plaint since he contemplated answering the same. The defendant-
appellant failed to answer said complaint and the court upon the 
hearing authorized the default of said defendant-appellant} and 
for a good cause being shown waived the remainder of the ninety 
day waiting period* This was done in accordance with 30-3-18} 
Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as Amended. The jurisdiction of the 
court was had as to the person and res of the suit. Under Rule 
55-2 of Utah Rules of Civil Proceedure, no notice need be given 
any defendant in default. The Legislature in 30-3-18, Utah Code 
Annotated, 1953, as Amended does not provide for an additional 
hearing for a defendant in default. Thus we see that no notice 
of a subsequent hearing was ever intended to be had or oust the 
jurisdiction* 
POINT I 
THE ACTION OF THE TRIAL COURT WAS VALID 
Since defendant-appellant had not answered the complaint 
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or to the knowledge of the court or plaintiff-respondent or plain-
tiff •respondentfs attorney attempted to answer the complaint the 
court could enter a default judgment. 
The court at the time of the hearing further noted that 
since the defendant-appellant had been in jail a number of times 
and had used drugs there was no hope of reconciliation of the 
parties thus the ninety day waiting period should be waived. 
The court nor plaintiff-respondent not plaintiff-respondent1s 
attorney had any knowledge that the defendant-appellant was being 
deprived of his rights in answering the complaint* 
The fact that the court did not put this finding, that 
said ninety day period would be waived, in its minute entry was 
an oversight by the judge who did so order as shown by the fact 
that he included it in his Findings of Fact and Conclusions of 
Law and Judgment and Decree of Divorce, 
The defendant-appellant did not rely upon the statutory 
ninety day waiting period since he did not at the ninety day limit 
attempt to appear before the court or make any written communi-
cation with it, 
30-3-18 Utah Code Annotated, 1953 (Amended) does not 
forbid the court from holding a hearing on the divorce case be-
fore the end of the ninety day waiting period nor does the section 
allow the defendant-appellant ninety days in which to file an 
answer, but rather leaving it to the sound discretion of the court 
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to determine the facts* If the legislature had wanted to extend 
the time for answering they would have so stated in the statute; 
this they did not do nor did they define "good Cause", thus leav-
in it up to the court to determine this matter also. Therefore, 
the term "good Cause" as referedto in 30-3-18 UGA 1953 as Mended 
is left solely to the discretion of the judge# Under 30-3-6} 30-3-7 
and 30*3-18 UCA 1953 as Amended, the statutes give the trial judge 
discretionary power in the matters of waiving the ninety day waiting = 
period and the length of time to be waited before the divorce becomes 
final* The defendant-appellant had all the time allowed by law to 
answer and prepare a defense to the complaint in said divorce case* 
The defendant-appellant has not claimed that he has 
any defense to the grounds in said case* The only things he wants 
to contest is the paternity and one item of personal property 
which could be done by other proceedings. Hence, if the Judgment 
and Decree of Divorse is set aside the defendant-appellant would 
be no futher ahead* 
In answer to the defendant-appellant^ claim due to Rule 
5 (a) of Utah Rules of Civil Proceedure, it should be noted that 
the plaintiff-respondent asked for no new or additional relief, 
therefore defendant-appallant was not entitled to notice* 
In this case there was really no need for the ninety 
day waiting period* or "cooling off" period as there was no attempt 
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by the defendant-appellant either before or after the divorce 
for reconciliation of the matter* He had placed himself by his 
own actions beyond the point where he could make such a move* 
The court must, therefore consider the statutes and 
rule thereon* All the cases I found dealt with the peculiarity 
of the statutes in question which were not exactly like those 
of Utah. 
POINT II 
THE LOWER COURT WAS RIGHT IN REFUSING TO SET ASIDE ITS 
DECREE OF DIVORCE 
Public Policy dictates that a decree of divorce should 
be final and that the parties may rely upon it unless it is chal-
lenged within a reasonable time limit* Section 60 of the Utah 
Rules of Civil Proceedure requires that a decree of divorce or 
judgment to be set aside must be commenced within a reasonable 
time limitt and in no event more than three months* In this 
case defendant-appellant did not seek to set aside the divorce 
in a reasonable time limit since he did not seek to set it aside 
until more than three years after the decree* 
To show an abuse of discretion the Supreme Court of 
Utah has held in many cases that the motion must be timely filed* 
In this case the defendant-appellant made no aterapt to set aside 
the default judgment and relied thereon for a period of more than 
three years* The reliance is shown by the fact he did not attempt 
to resume his marital status with the plaintiff•respondent nor 
visit the said child. The following is the ruling of the Supreme 
Court of Utah as to abuse of discretion in setting aside judgments: 
Echo Ney, Trustee, Wasatch Homes, Inc«, a Corporation 
y« G# T. Harrison and Alda J* Harrison, 299 P. 2d 1116# 
In the recent case of Warren v. Dixon Ranch Company, 
we had occassion to review the policy consideration 
and reaffirmed the attitude of liberal consideration, 
thus s 
The allowance of a vaction of judgment is a creature 
of equity designed to relieve against harshness of 
enforcing a judgment, which may occur through proceed-
ual difficulties, the wrongs of the opposing party or 
misfortunes which prevent the presentation of a claim 
or defence, *** Equity considers factors which may be 
irrelevant in actions at law, such as the *** hardship 
in granting or denying relief. Although an equity 
court or longer has complete discretion in granting 
or denying relief it may exercise wide judicial dis-
cretion in weighing the factors of fairness and public 
convenience,^ and this court on appeal will reverse the 
trial court only where an abuse of this discretion is 
clearly shown# 
In the case of Bylund v» Crook, 208 P. 504; 60 U# 285 
the following is the ruling of the Supreme Court of Utah in set-
ting aside default judgments: 
Our trial courts are usually very liberal in vacating 
and setting aside default judgments entered against a 
defaulting party by reason of mistake, inadvertence, 
or excusable neglect, or in case where there has been 
fraud or deceit practiced* Under our practice it is 
generally regarded as an abuse of discretion for a 
trial court not to vacate and set aside a default judg-
ment when there is any reasonable grounds for doing 
so* and timely application is made» But in this par-
ticular instance it is our judgment that no reasonable 
grounds existed, and that it would have been error 
for the court to have done so» 
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The sheriff made a return of the service of Summons 
and Complaint in the matter in accordance with the Utah Rules 
ii 
of Civil Proceedure showing that same was served personally 
upon the defendant-appellant and the said defendant-appellant H 
admits that he received the Summons and Complaint* The plaintiff- 11 
ii 
respondent, in the lower court, had the right to rely on the 
service* In excess of three years had passed before the defend- j 
ant-appellant made any objections* Therefore, the defendant-
appellant has no right to claim that the court has abused its 
3 
discretion in this regard* u 
ii 
Public Policy dictates that a decree of divorce should 
be final and that the parties may rely upon it unless it is chal- " 
g 
lenged within a reasonable time l i m i t * 
POINT I I I
 ia 
DEFENDANT-APPELLANT MUST SHOW A MERITORIOUS DEFENSE 
24 Am. Jur* 2d. 471 , Sec* 331 , Neces s i t y for Mer i t o r ious 
Defense* 
1 
i 
The general rule that a defendant against who a 
judgment has been rendered must show a meritorius I 
defense, as a condition of his right to proceed g 
for the vacation of the judgment, or to seek 
equitable relief against the judgment, applies
 H 
to a judgment or decree of divorce* It is accord-
ingly held that if the defendant in the divorce 
action asks that the decree be set aside he must 
ordinarily show that he has a meritorious defense ' 
to the action, making it at least a possibility i 
that if a new trial is had, the judgment will be 
a different one* "• 
i 
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An exception to the rule imposing such a requirement 
is made where the attack on the judgment or decree 
is made solely on the gounds of want of jurisdiction, 
not involving a submission to the jurisdiction of 
the court to pass on the merits of the case* 
In applying the foregoing rules of law to the instance 
case, the defendant-appellant relies solely on the non-access of 
defendant-appellant to plaintiff-respondent between October 14, 
1968 and October 14, 1969, The said child was born on May 5, 
1970* The defendant-appellant has not represented to the court 
that he had furloughs during that period. According to the 
plaintiff-respondent, defendant-appellant did have furloughs 
during his imprisonment and did visit with her and have sexual 
relations with her* However, under the affidavit of the plain-
tiff-respondent, we find the child was not named and a supplemen-
tal name report had to be filed with the Utah State Department 
of Vital Statistics* This was one on certificate number 70-25-
9460* The defendant^appellant signed a notarized supplemental 
name report acknowledging he was the father of said child* The 
defendant-appellant permitted the child to use his name* Under 
70-30-12 UCA 1953 it states that if a father publicly acknowledges 
a child to be his and so treats him he is regarded as the natural 
child of that parent* 
When a child is born within wedlock it is the legal 
presumption that tjjc married couple is in fact the parents of 
the child unless it is disputed by the father at that time, 
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which was not done in the case dealt with in this action* Until 
the child was more than four years of age defendant-appellant 
did not dispute the fact that the child was his. 
Thus we see the defendant-appellant would have no stand 
ing to claim the child was not his own, If anyone misrepresented 
to the lower court it would be the defendant-appellant by his 
action of trying to set aside the Default Judgment and Decree* 
The plaintiff-respondent was satisfied that the child was sired 
by the defendant-appellant* If a new trial was had the outcome 
would be tihchanged* 
At any time with in the four years after the birth of 
the child* the defendant-appellant could have filed an independ-
ant action against the plaintiff-respondent to determine the 
paternity of the child* Society has the right to be able to de-
pend on the finality of divorce atters and not have to wonder if 
subsequent marriages will be voided at a later date* Injury to 
innocent parties may be had in such cases and should be avoided 
at all costs* 
CONCLUSION 
The lower court had jurisdiction of the persons and 
subject matter of said law suit. Within the discretion of the 
lowev court a hearing was held upon the divorce matterj the 
iowever court determined the case, filed its Pindgings of Fact 
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and Conclusions of Law and Decree and the d ivo rce became f i n a l * 
Based upon the b r i e f , p l a i n t i f f - r e s p o n d e n t p rays t h a t t h e Motion 
to Set Aside the Default Judgment be denied* 
Respec t fu l ly Submitted, 
PAUL J , MERRILL 
Attorney for P la in t i f f -Responden t 
30 North Main S t r e e t 
Spanish Fork, Utah 84660 
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